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GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 Plaintiff-appellant Vetrotex CertainTeed Corporation 
("Vetrotex"), a Pennsylvania corporation, brought suit in the 
federal district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
against defendant-appellee Consolidated Fiber Glass Products 
Company ("Conglas"), a California corporation.  The issue 
presented in this appeal is whether the district court properly 
dismissed the complaint of Vetrotex for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.  Because it is not contested that general 
jurisdiction does not lie, and because we find that Conglas has 
not purposefully directed its activities toward Pennsylvania for 
purposes of specific jurisdiction, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
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 Vetrotex is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the 
manufacture and sale of various fiber glass reinforcement 
products.  Vetrotex, which was incorporated in March of 1991, is 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of CertainTeed Corporation 
("CertainTeed"), another Pennsylvania corporation.  Vetrotex is a 
national corporation with facilities and offices in several 
states, including California.  Conglas is a California 
corporation engaged in the manufacture of fiber glass roofing 
products, including fiber glass mats.  Conglas has no offices, 
employees or representatives in Pennsylvania, nor has it ever 
sold any of its products in Pennsylvania, or engaged in sales to 
distributors or other third parties who sell Conglas products in 
Pennsylvania. 
 Between 1980 and 1989, Conglas and CertainTeed engaged 
in sporadic contracts for fiber glass products, which culminated 
in a letter dated May 19, 1989 from CertainTeed to Conglas, 
stating that CertainTeed would not be able to supply all of 
Conglas's needs for glass and urging Conglas to go to another 
vendor for glass.  The CertainTeed letter concluded by stating: 
"Finally, Jack, I want to thank you for our business relationship 
over the past years.  I plan on continuing this contact for none 
of us can foretell the future and its opportunities."  After this 
arrangement was terminated, Conglas had no further business 
relationship with CertainTeed.0 
                     
0Between May of 1989 and February of 1991, the record reveals no 
relationship between Conglas and CertainTeed/Vetrotex.  Indeed, 
the prior relationship between the parties had ended by 1989 and 
a new relationship began in 1991 when CertainTeed/Vetrotex 
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 In February of 1991, CertainTeed again found itself 
with a supply of chopped strands to sell, and it communicated 
with Conglas to ascertain if Conglas would be interested in 
purchasing "44E" chopped strand.  During the week of February 11, 
1991, CertainTeed met with representatives of Conglas in 
California to solicit Conglas's purchase of CertainTeed's fiber 
glass materials.  On February 25, 1991, CertainTeed wrote and 
forwarded an agreement to Conglas in California.  Upon receiving 
the letter, Conglas executed the agreement and returned it to 
CertainTeed's headquarters in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania (the 
"1991 Supply Agreement"). 
 In March of 1991, Vetrotex was incorporated as 
CertainTeed's wholly-owned subsidiary in charge of fiber glass 
reinforcement products operations. 
 In January of 1992, representatives of 
CertainTeed/Vetrotex flew to California and met with Conglas to 
discuss a continuation of CertainTeed's agreement to sell chopped 
strands to Conglas.  At that meeting, the essential terms of a 
                                                                  
solicited business from Conglas and entered into the 1991 and 
1992 Supply Agreements.  Those agreements, as discussed in text, 
were initiated by CertainTeed/Vetrotex and all the contacts with 
respect to those agreements were California contacts. 
    It was obviously for this reason that the parties joined 
issue only with respect to specific jurisdiction rather than 
general jurisdiction, the latter of which would have involved the 
various pre-1989 matters with which Judge Roth is concerned and 
which we read as the premise for the dissent. 
     In light of the new relationship initiated by Vetrotex in 
1991 and the parties' acknowledgement that Burger King's specific 
jurisdiction teachings control our disposition, we attach little 
relevance to the general jurisdictional elements emphasized by 
the dissent.  General jurisdiction was not a theory urged by 
Vetrotex. 
5 
new agreement were negotiated between Conglas and 
CertainTeed/Vetrotex.  Conglas did not send representatives to 
Pennsylvania to meet with Vetrotex.  Conglas did, however, place 
some telephone calls to CertainTeed/Vetrotex's offices in Valley 
Forge, Pennsylvania in the course of negotiating the renewal of 
the 1991 Supply Agreement 
 On March 13, 1992, CertainTeed/Vetrotex and Conglas 
renewed the 1991 Supply Agreement (now the "1992 Supply 
Agreement").  The 1992 Supply Agreement was prepared by 
CertainTeed/Vetrotex and sent to Conglas in California, where it 
was executed.  The 1992 Supply Agreement provided for a two-year 
contract period that would automatically be renewed for an 
additional one-year period commencing April 1, 1994, unless 
canceled upon sixty-days notice. 
  Under the 1992 Supply Agreement, Vetrotex agreed to 
ship fiber glass material directly from its plant in Wichita 
Falls, Texas, to Conglas's manufacturing facility in Bakersfield, 
California.  Vetrotex's invoicing for the product sold under the 
1992 Supply Agreement was handled by Vetrotex's Southern 
California office, and all payments for the fiber glass material 
were sent to Vetrotex's office in Los Angeles, California. 
Conglas's primary contact at Vetrotex was Jerry Leland, a sales 
representative working out of Vetrotex's Santa Ana, California 
office. 
 In 1993, Vetrotex decided to withdraw from the fiber 
glass chopped strand business and sought to terminate its 
contract with Conglas.  Vetrotex claims that it canceled the 1992 
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agreement by telephone on December 2, 1993, more than sixty days 
prior to the April 1, 1994 deadline.  According to Conglas, it 
was only on March 23, 1994 that Vetrotex telephoned Conglas in 
California with the information that Vetrotex would not sell any 
more fiber glass chopped strand product to Conglas after March 
31, 1994.  Vetrotex ceased delivery of 44E strand, and Conglas 
withheld payment on outstanding invoices. 
 On May 12, 1994, Vetrotex brought the present diversity 
action against Conglas in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
seeking to recover $303,595.35 in withheld payments from Conglas. 
Shortly thereafter, Conglas sued Vetrotex in California state 
court, seeking damages for breach of the 1992 Supply Agreement. 
Vetrotex then removed the California action to the Central 
District of California, where it is currently stayed pending the 
resolution of this appeal.  Vetrotex has not yet counterclaimed 
in the California action, but admitted at oral argument before us 
that there is no impediment to its filing a counterclaim in that 
action. 
 On July 5, 1994, Conglas moved to dismiss Vetrotex's 
Pennsylvania action for lack of personal jurisdiction or, 
alternatively, for improper venue.  On October 18, 1994, the 
district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a 
memorandum and order entered on October 20, 1994, dismissing 
Vetrotex's complaint without prejudice for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. 
 The district court found the relevant and dispositive 
facts, which we recite in text, infra, to be undisputed. 
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Accordingly, the district court concluded that Conglas's contacts 
with Pennsylvania were "marginal and were not directed at 
Pennsylvania to benefit from its laws" and held that to exercise 
jurisdiction over Conglas "would offend traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice."  Id.   Vetrotex appealed. 
 
II. 
A. 
 "Whether personal jurisdiction may be exercised over an 
out-of-state defendant is a question of law, and this court's 
review is therefore plenary."  Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, N.A. v. 
DiVeronica Bros., Inc., 983 F.2d 551, 554 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 
Mesalic v. Fiberfloat Corp., 897 F.2d 696, 698 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
We review any factual findings made by the district court for 
clear error.  Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 
F.2d 1217, 1220 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 A district court sitting in diversity applies the law 
of the forum state in determining whether personal jurisdiction 
is proper.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).  Pennsylvania's long-arm 
statute provides that its reach is coextensive with the limits 
placed on the states by the federal Constitution.  42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 5322(b) (1981).  We therefore look to federal 
constitutional doctrine to determine Conglas's susceptibility to 
personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.  The due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment places limits on the power of a state to 
assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). 
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 The due process limit to the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction is defined by a two-prong test.  First, the 
defendant must have made constitutionally sufficient "minimum 
contacts" with the forum.  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 
U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (the "constitutional touchstone" of personal 
jurisdiction is "whether the defendant purposefully established 
'minimum contacts' in the forum State").  The determination of 
whether minimum contacts exist requires an examination of "the 
relationship among the forum, the defendant and the litigation," 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977), in order to 
determine whether the defendant has "'purposefully directed'" its 
activities toward residents of the forum.  Burger King, 471 U.S. 
at 472 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 
774 (1984)).  There must be "some act by which the defendant 
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws."  Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 
(1958).  Second, if "minimum contacts" are shown, jurisdiction 
may be exercised where the court determines, in its discretion, 
that to do so would comport with "traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice."  International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945);  Farino, 960 F.2d at 1222. 
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B. 
 Vetrotex alleged that the district court had specific 
jurisdiction over Conglas.  "Specific jurisdiction is invoked 
when the cause of action arises from the defendant's forum 
related activities," North Penn Gas Co. v. Corning Natural Gas 
Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 690 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
847 (1990); see Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 
U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984);  Dollar Sav. Bank v. First Sec. Bank of 
Utah, N.A., 746 F.2d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 1984), such that the 
defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court 
there."  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
297 (1980).  Vetrotex does not allege general jurisdiction.0 
 As is evident from the complaint, this action concerns 
only Conglas's alleged breach of the 1992 Supply Agreement.  The 
1992 Supply Agreement, standing alone, is an insufficient ground 
upon which to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over 
Conglas.  See Grand Entertainment Group, Ltd. v. Star Media 
Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[A] contract 
alone does not 'automatically establish sufficient minimum 
contacts in the other party's home forum.'") (quoting Burger 
King, 471 U.S. at 478);  Mellon Bank (East) v. DiVeronica Bros., 
                     
0
"General jurisdiction is invoked when the plaintiff's cause of 
action arises from the defendant's non-forum related activities." 
North Penn Gas Co. v. Corning Natural Gas Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 
690 n.2 (3d Cir. 1990).  To establish general jurisdiction, the 
plaintiff must show that the defendant has maintained "continuous 
and systematic" contacts with the forum. See Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 & 416 
(1984); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.15 
(1985). 
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Inc., 983 F.2d 551, 557 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Contracting with a 
resident of the forum state does not alone justify the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.") (citing 
Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 
1222 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
 In determining whether specific jurisdiction exists, 
however, we consider not only the contract but also "prior 
negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the 
terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing." 
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479. 
 
III. 
A. 
 The facts underlying the present case are not in 
dispute.  Vetrotex solicited Conglas to obtain the 1991 Supply 
Agreement by telephone and by personal visits to Conglas 
headquarters in California.0  Conglas did not solicit the 1991 
Supply Agreement, and no Conglas personnel ever visited 
Pennsylvania.  Conglas signed the 1991 Supply Agreement in 
California and sent it to CertainTeed in Pennsylvania. Similarly, 
with respect to the 1992 Supply Agreement, officers of 
CertainTeed flew to California to negotiate that contract.  The 
1992 Supply Agreement was prepared by CertainTeed and sent to 
Conglas in California, where it was executed.  No product was 
                     
0Even though the complaint does not mention the 1991 Supply 
Agreement, we find it to be relevant as a "prior negotiation" to 
the 1992 Supply Agreement, which had renewed the 1991 Supply 
Agreement.   
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shipped from, through, or to Pennsylvania.  Instead, the chopped 
strand was manufactured in Texas and shipped directly from 
Vetrotex's plant in Texas to Conglas's facility in California. 
Vetrotex handled all of the transportation arrangements and paid 
the transportation costs.  Vetrotex's invoicing for product sold 
under the 1992 Supply Agreement was handled by Vetrotex's 
California office.  Conglas made all payments for goods to 
Vetrotex's California office. 
 The district court found, among other things that the 
following facts were not in dispute: 
Vetrotex solicited Conglas to obtain the 
1991-92 contract by telephone and by personal 
visits to Conglas headquarters in California. 
The parties engaged in telephone 
communication prior to entering into the 
1991-92 contract.  Conglas signed the 
disputed contract in California and sent it 
to Vetrotex in Pennsylvania.  Conglas made 
all payments for goods to Vetrotex 
CertainTeed's California office.  Under the 
disputed contract, Vetrotex did not deliver 
any goods to Conglas in Pennsylvania. 
 
(Memorandum and Order entered October 20, 1994 at 4). 
Understandably, Vetrotex agreed at oral argument that none of 
these findings of fact are clearly erroneous.  See North Penn Gas 
v. Corning Natural Gas, 897 F.2d 687, 688 (3d Cir. 1990) ("A 
determination of minimum contacts is based upon findings of fact. 
As such, the district court's factual findings will not be 
disturbed unless clearly erroneous.").  The district court also 
found that Vetrotex "has not shown solicitation, advertisement, 
or delivery by Conglas in Pennsylvania since 1989."  Id. at 3. 
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 The only contacts that Conglas had with Pennsylvania 
consisted of some telephone calls and letters written to Vetrotex 
in Pennsylvania.  However, this Court has recognized that 
"informational communications in furtherance of [a contract 
between a resident and a nonresident] does not establish the 
purposeful activity necessary for a valid assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over [the nonresident defendant]."  Sunbelt Corp. v. 
Noble, Denton & Assoc., Inc., 5 F.3d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(citing Stuart v. Spademann, 772 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(stating that "an exchange of communications between a resident 
and a nonresident in developing a contract is insufficient of 
itself to be characterized as purposeful activity invoking the 
benefits and protection of the forum state's laws")). 
 Thus, in the present case, Conglas was merely a 
"passive buyer" of Vetrotex's product.0  We hold that the 
undisputed circumstances attending Conglas's 1991 and 1992 Supply 
Agreements with Vetrotex do not support the conclusion that 
Conglas "purposefully availed" itself of the privilege of doing 
business in Pennsylvania for purposes of the district court's 
                     
0The Eighth Circuit has recognized that "reaching out" is 
particularly difficult to find where the nonresident defendant is 
a buyer, rather than a seller, of the resident plaintiff's 
products.  See Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. Trans Western Polymers, 
Inc., 53 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 1995).  This distinction is even 
more telling when the defendant is a "passive" buyer, i.e. one 
which has been solicited as a customer of the plaintiff.  See 
Stewart, A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 5, 45-46 (1989).  The First Circuit, for instance, requires 
a showing that the defendant's forum-related activities in 
contract cases were "instrumental in the formation of the 
contract."  United Elec. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 
F.2d 1080, 1089 (1st Cir. 1992). 
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exercise of personal jurisdiction over Conglas.  See Sunbelt 
Corp., 5 F.3d at 32 (holding that a Pennsylvania corporation's 
contract with a Texas corporation and post-contract telephone and 
facsimile communications with the same were insufficient to show 
"purposeful availment" of the privilege of doing business in 
Texas, for purposes of the Texas long-arm statute, the latter of 
which is co-extensive with the reach of the federal 
constitution).0 
 The instant case is distinguishable from other cases 
where jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant has been premised 
largely on the defendant's contract with a resident of the forum 
state.  For instance, this is not a case where the defendant 
solicited the contract or initiated the business relationship 
leading up to the contract.  Compare Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, 
Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1992).  Nor is this 
a case where the defendant sent any payments to the plaintiff in 
the forum state, compare North Penn Gas v. Corning Natural Gas, 
897 F.2d 687, 690-91 (3d Cir. 1990), or where the defendant 
engaged in extensive post-sale contacts with the plaintiff in the 
forum state.  Compare Mesalic v. Fiberfloat Corp., 897 F.2d 696, 
700 (3d Cir. 1990) (after selling a boat to New Jersey buyer, 
                     
0Vetrotex also argues that the fact that the invoices as distinct 
from the general Supply Agreements, provided as a term and 
condition, that they (the invoices) were to be governed by and 
should be construed in accordance with Pennsylvania law, is 
relevant to personal jurisdiction over this case.  We disagree. 
The choice of law provisions pertain only to the individual sales 
contracts for each shipment of fiber glass chopped strand, and we 
do not find them relevant to our jurisdictional analysis of the 
underlying Supply Agreements.  
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defendant sent written correspondence to the buyer's New Jersey 
residence, delivered the boat to New Jersey, and attempted to 
repair the boat in New Jersey). 
B. 
 Vetrotex argues that the relationship that existed 
between Conglas and CertainTeed in the 1980s are also relevant as 
"prior negotiations" or "course of dealing" with respect to the 
1992 Supply Contract under Burger King.  Burger King's reference 
to "prior negotiations," "future consequences," "terms of the 
contract," and "course of dealing," however, clearly contemplates 
dealings between the parties in regard to the disputed contract, 
not dealings unrelated to the cause of action.  In Burger King, 
the Court found specific jurisdiction over a Michigan franchisee, 
Rudzewicz, in the franchisor Burger King's home state, Florida, 
where "Rudzewicz deliberately reached out beyond Michigan and 
negotiated with a Florida corporation," id. at 479-80, to enter 
into a "carefully structured 20-year relationship that envisioned 
continuing and wide-reaching contacts."  Id. at 480. 
 In the present case, the negotiations that occurred 
between Vetrotex and CertainTeed in the 1980s are unrelated to 
the 1992 Supply Contract and are not relevant to specific 
jurisdiction.0  See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (the 
cause of action must "arise[] out of" or "relate[] to" the 
defendant's contacts with the forum);  Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 
414 n.8;  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 
                     
0As earlier noted in text, Vetrotex has argued this appeal only 
on the issue of specific, and not general, jurisdiction. 
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(1985);  C.L. Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 
1553, 1559 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 480 (1994); Dollar 
Sav. Bank v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 746 F.2d 208, 211 (3d 
Cir. 1984). 
 Vetrotex would characterize the "thirteen-month hiatus" 
in the parties' dealings from 1989 to 1991 as a mere interruption 
in an ongoing course of dealing.  The district court did not 
agree, nor do we.  The relationship between the parties in which 
CertainTeed supplied Conglas with fiber glass chopped strands was 
terminated by CertainTeed's letter of May 19, 1989, which urged 
Conglas to look elsewhere for suppliers.  The 1991 Supply 
Agreement (renewed by the 1992 Supply Agreement at issue here) 
began a new relationship between the parties, separate and apart 
from the prior relationship.  There is no evidence in the record 
that the parties understood the 1991 and 1992 Supply Contracts to 
be merely a continuation of the relationship that the parties had 
in the 1980s.0 
 Conglas has not "purposefully availed itself" of the 
privilege of doing business in Pennsylvania for purposes of 
establishing the "minimum contacts" required for specific 
jurisdiction.  Nor has Vetrotex established "minimum contacts" on 
any other grounds between Conglas and Pennsylvania for purposes 
                     
0Thus, we find Associated Business Telephone Systems Corp. v. 
Greater Capital Corp., 861 F.2d 793, 797 (3d Cir. 1988), to be 
distinguishable.  In that case, we held that a district court in 
New Jersey had specific jurisdiction over a California 
corporation that had entered into a contract with a New Jersey 
corporation. However, the contract there provided for a ten-year 
life and created continuing obligations between the two 
companies.  
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of specific jurisdiction.0  Accordingly, we hold that the 
assertion of jurisdiction over Conglas would violate the 
fundamental dictates of due process. 
 
IV. 
 We will affirm the district court's dismissal of 
Vetrotex's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
                     
0Because we have concluded that Vetrotex has not made the 
threshold showing of sufficient minimum contacts with 
Pennsylvania to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over Conglas, we need not address the secondary issue of whether 
exercising jurisdiction would comport with fair play and 
substantial justice. See Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. Trans Western 
Polymers, Inc., 53 F.3d 920, 921 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Due process 
requires both minimum contacts with the forum state and accord 
with the notions of 'fair play and substantial justice.'") 
(emphasis added) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 
U.S. 462, 474 (1985)). 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, Dissenting: 
 As I read the Supreme Court's decision in Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985), a court determining 
whether specific personal jurisdiction lies must consider prior 
business dealings between the parties.  The majority opinion in 
this case, however, plays down the importance of a long business 
relationship established between Conglas and CertainTeed/Vetrotex 
during the 1980s.  The majority focuses only on the final 1992 
Supply Contract, see Majority Op. at ___ (slip op. at 14), 
despite the fact that the 1992 contract grew out of and was 
founded upon a thirteen-year-old working relationship.   
 I believe that the majority's narrow focus on the 1992 
contract misinterprets the Supreme Court's rule in Burger King by 
refusing to consider the entire "course of dealings" between the 
relevant parties.  The negotiations and dealings during the 1980s 
are, in my opinion, both relevant and related to the present 
cause of action.  Because I would find that Conglas purposefully 
availed itself of the privilege of conducting business within 
Pennsylvania by virtue of its longstanding business relationship 
with Vetrotex, I write in dissent. 
I. 
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 In its discussion of the facts, the majority opinion 
emphasizes the 1991 and 1992 Supply Contracts and minimizes a 
significant course of dealings that occurred between the parties 
during the 1980s.  These dealings affected the negotiation of the 
1992 Supply Agreement and should not have been dismissed by the 
court as irrelevant.  The omitted facts demonstrate that Conglas 
initiated and pursued a contractual relationship with CertainTeed 
at its Pennsylvania office and made sufficient voluntary contacts 
with Pennsylvania such that it should have "reasonably 
anticipate[d] being haled into court there."  World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
 On April 30, 1980, Conglas sent CertainTeed a new 
product announcement for Conmat-90, a fiber glass roofing mat, 
expressly soliciting orders for the new product.  In July 1981, 
Conglas representative Tom Pessel followed up on Conglas's April 
1980 solicitation letter by visiting CertainTeed's Blue Bell, 
Pennsylvania office to discuss CertainTeed's requirements for 
fiber glass mat and Conglas's ability to satisfy those 
requirements.  Following additional correspondence between 
Conglas and CertainTeed's Pennsylvania offices, CertainTeed 
placed an order for Conglas mats in November 1981. 
 In early 1982, Conglas and CertainTeed negotiated a 
formal agreement pursuant to which Conglas agreed to sell fiber 
glass mat to CertainTeed for the twelve-month period from 
February 1, 1982 through January 31, 1983.  After the execution 
of the 1982 agreement, Conglas and CertainTeed began a 
collaborative effort to resolve quality control issues raised by 
19 
CertainTeed's testing of Conglas's fiber glass mats.  This 
process resulted in regular communication between Conglas and 
CertainTeed personnel located in Pennsylvania, as well as a 
number of visits by Conglas representatives to the CertainTeed 
facility located in Blue Bell, Pennsylvania.   
 Conglas and CertainTeed entered into sales agreements 
similar to the 1982 agreement in February 1983 and May 1984. 
Despite these successive agreements, the Conglas mats failed to 
qualify for use in CertainTeed's roofing shingles.  For this 
reason, CertainTeed terminated the 1984 agreement.  Conglas later 
contacted CertainTeed in 1986 and 1989 regarding the sale to 
CertainTeed of fiber glass mats, but no further agreements were 
reached. 
 In addition to this business relationship involving the 
sale of Conglas fiber glass mats to CertainTeed, the parties also 
entered into a business relationship in which CertainTeed sold 
chopped fiber glass strands to Conglas.  Although the record is 
devoid of any written agreements documenting sales of chopped 
strands to Conglas during the 1980s, CertainTeed did produce 
correspondence between the parties pertaining to such activities. 
Correspondence in the record indicates that in 1987 and 1988 
CertainTeed provided Conglas with a certain volume of chopped 
strands each month.  On December 8, 1987, representatives of 
Conglas visited CertainTeed in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania.  Among 
the topics discussed was CertainTeed's supply to Conglas of 
chopped strands. 
20 
 CertainTeed's sale of chopped strands to Conglas was 
interrupted, apparently at the end of 1989, when CertainTeed was 
unable to meet Conglas's needs due to supply shortages.  In 
February 1991, however, CertainTeed again found itself with 
chopped strands to sell.  CertainTeed and Conglas entered into 
negotiations regarding the terms of a sales agreement.  David 
Sharpe, a Vice President at CertainTeed, participated in these 
negotiations from his office in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, and 
he forwarded a letter agreement (the "1991 Supply Contract") to 
Conglas in California from Pennsylvania.  The 1991 Supply 
Contract is on CertainTeed letterhead with its Pennsylvania 
headquarters address prominently displayed.  Upon receiving the 
1991 Supply Contract, a Conglas representative executed the 
agreement and returned it to CertainTeed's Pennsylvania 
headquarters. 
 On March 13, 1992, in anticipation of the expiration of 
the 1991 Supply Contract, the parties entered into another 
agreement (the "1992 Supply Contract").  By this time 
CertainTeed's subsidiary, Vetrotex, had been incorporated. 
Pursuant to the 1992 Supply Contract, Vetrotex agreed to continue 
selling chopped fiber glass strands to Conglas.  As noted in the 
majority opinion, Dick Sharpe received several telephone calls 
from Conglas at his Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, office in 
negotiating the terms of the 1992 Supply Contract.  Like the 1991 
Supply Contract, the 1992 Supply Contract is printed on 
Vetrotex/CertainTeed letterhead, displaying the company's 
Pennsylvania address. 
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II. 
A. 
 Because this case involves a contract between 
interstate parties, the Supreme Court's opinion in Burger King is 
the analytical keystone.  See Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, N.A. v. 
Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1222 (3d Cir. 1992).  In upholding the 
district court's exercise of specific personal jurisdiction in 
Burger King, the Supreme Court noted that the minimum contacts 
inquiry is a "fair warning" requirement of due process, which is 
satisfied "if the defendant has 'purposefully directed' his 
activities at residents of the forum, and litigation results from 
alleged injuries that 'arise out of or relate to' those 
activities."  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (citations omitted). 
The Court explained: 
 
[W]ith respect to interstate contractual obligations, 
we have emphasized that parties who "reach out beyond 
one state and create continuing obligations with 
citizens of another state" are subject to regulation 
and sanctions in the other State for the consequences 
of their activities. . .. [W]here individuals 
"purposely derive benefit" from their interstate 
activities, it may well be unfair to allow them to 
escape having to account in other States for 
consequences that arise proximately from such 
activities . . .. 
Id. at 473-74 (citations omitted).  Thus, under Burger King, 
parties taking the affirmative step of negotiating and entering 
into interstate contractual obligations will likely subject 
themselves to specific personal jurisdiction in the other state. 
The Court warned, however, that "an individual's contract with an 
out-of-state party alone [cannot] automatically establish 
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sufficient minimum contacts in the other party's home forum." Id. 
at 478 (emphasis in original).  Such a mechanical test has been 
explicitly rejected. 
 Instead, when deciding the question of specific 
personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court favors a "highly 
realistic" approach that takes into account factors such as 
"prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences," and 
"the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of 
dealing."  Id. at 479.  The reality of the situation in this case 
is that CertainTeed/Vetrotex and Conglas were involved in a 
business relationship spanning more than ten years.  Over those 
years, Conglas affirmatively solicited business with CertainTeed, 
repeatedly made phone calls to Pennsylvania, sent employees to 
visit CertainTeed's facilities in Pennsylvania, and mailed 
contracts to Pennsylvania to be signed.  Additionally, Conglas 
deliberately involved itself in several contractual obligations 
with CertainTeed/Vetrotex, fully aware that these corporations 
were headquartered in Pennsylvania.  Thus, the facts in the 
instant case reveal that Conglas is not being brought into 
Pennsylvania solely as a result of "random," "fortuitous," or 
"attenuated" contacts, nor as a result of the "unilateral 
activity of another party or third person."  Id. at 475 
(citations omitted).  Rather, Conglas has knowingly and 
deliberately engaged in a pattern of contacts with Pennsylvania 
such that Conglas should have expected that it could be subject 
to litigation there. 
III. 
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 Until now, the question whether two parties' prior 
business relationships should be taken into account in 
determining the existence of specific personal jurisdiction has 
not been addressed by this court.  As in all issues of personal 
jurisdiction, however, this question cannot be answered 
mechanically.  Instead, each case must be individually evaluated 
in full to determine whether the parties' "actual course of 
dealing" is such that the nonresident party was effectively on 
notice that it might be haled into court in the other party's 
home forum.  In the instant case, it is clear that Conglas, 
through its long history of dealing with CertainTeed and its 
subsidiary Vetrotex, engaged in repeated contacts with 
representatives and facilities located in Pennsylvania.  By 
virtue of these extensive contacts, Conglas was on notice that it 
could be subject to litigation in Pennsylvania.  Thus, the 
longstanding relationship between these parties is relevant and 
should have been taken into account in determining whether 
Conglas established sufficient minimum contacts in Pennsylvania. 
See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. FMALI, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1496, 
1498-99 (E.D. Va. 1994) (taking parties' continuing relationship 
into consideration in finding that specific personal jurisdiction 
was proper). 
 Accordingly, I dissent.  I believe that, based on the 
entire course of dealings between the parties, Conglas had 
minimum contacts in Pennsylvania sufficient to allow the district 
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Conglas.  I would 
therefore reverse the district court's order dismissing 
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Vetrotex's complaint and remand this case to the district court 
for further proceedings. 
